Although there are a considerable number of research papers dedicated to understanding the WEG internationalization process, we believe that the existing case studies are still extremely restricted to the counterpoint of the institutional narrative and international theories of internationalization. Our perspective, on the other hand, points in the direction of assessing the company's trajectory within the political economy of the sector. That is, it is not possible to analyze the process of transformation of a company over decades without understanding the institutional aspects of the whole sector and of the national policy that regulates and foments it, as well as the transformations in the international economy, in general. In this sense, this paper seeks not only to present WEG's trajectory based on the company's internal strategies and innovations, but also to relate these characteristics to the Brazilian institutional environment, especially during the military government, which seems to have been decisive both for the rise of the group nationally and for its later entry into the international market.
Introduction

WEG Electric Motors, originally named Eletromotores Jaraguá Ltda, is a recognized Brazilian
Company, which successfully internationalized. support of the engineering Ernest Braun. This investment plan allowed the company to triple its production in its first phase of internationalization, in order to meet the foreign market's needs. The project also provided for cooperation with other motor manufacturing companies and was approved by the Executive Group of the Electric and Electronic Industries (or GEINEE, its acronym in Portuguese), which operates under the Industrial Development Committee at the Ministry of Industry, Foreign Trade and Services. 2 Parallel to Brazil's industrial policy goals in the 1960s and 1970s, which prioritized the creation of capital-intensive sectors, Amsden (2001) notes that the competitive advantage of business groups in late industrialization countries is primarily linked to their planning strategies, management, logistics and exports, rather than any other specific ability that such groups may have, given that their operational sectors do not generally feature modern technologies. The objective here is to understand how, even in the face of this competitive barrier highlighted by the author, WEG became the largest manufacturer of electric motors in Latin America and the leading Brazilian exporter in this industrial segment.
Although there is a considerable amount of research devoted to understanding WEG's internationalization process, this paper is based on a belief that the existing case studies are still extremely circumscribed to the counterpoint of institutional narrative and international theories of internationalization. The perspective held by the authors, on the other hand, points in the direction of assessing the company's trajectory within the political economy of the sector. That is, it is not possible to analyze the process of a company transformation occurring over decades without understanding the institutional aspects of the whole sector and of the national policy that regulates and foments it or the transformations in the international economy in general. In this sense, this paper seeks not only to present WEG's trajectory based on the company's internal strategies and innovations, but also to relate these characteristics to the Brazilian institutional environment: first, during the military government, a decisive period for the rise of the group and for its entry into the international market; and secondly, during recent decades, when the company received great financial support from the BNDES to pursue its goal of internationalization.
The development of the electrical equipment sector in Brazil, 1950-1960 3
The founding of WEG dates back to the early 1960s and was part of a phase of profound transformation in the industrial structure of the Brazilian economy. Starting with the Targets Plan established by President Juscelino Kubitscheck, the Brazilian economy began to accelerate its process of forming a production assets sector, with the participation of the multinationals that would be established from that point forward. Over the following two decades, what Peter Evans called a "triple alliance" was created, which is the division of the Brazilian market between multinational corporations, national enterprises, and the government (Evans 1982) .
National companies, especially in sectors demanding large volumes of capital and modern technology, were therefore left with limited or supporting roles in the industrial development led by the multinational heavy industry established in the country.
The electricity sector, in this sense, would be one of those sectors that would undergo great transformation in this period. The government was becoming responsible for providing services, whether through regional government enterprises in the 1950s or through the federal government in the 1960s. Eletrobrás, a company providing commissioned production of electrical equipment, was beginning to be established in the country, with consumption that had up to that point been supplied through imports now being internalized. The Targets Plan put in place during the Kubitschek administration therefore made the energy sector a priority for the government, with this sector receiving 43 percent of all investments made between 1957 and 1961. If the goal was to achieve growth in annual energy output of more than 10 percent a year, certainly the demand for equipment represented a bottleneck to be overcome. After all, the country's industry only supplied electrical equipment for domestic use, electrical installations, wires and conductors, while it depended on imports for generators, turbines and transformers (Lessa 1975, 18-9) .
Illustrating the government's new tone in 1956, one of the main characters in the development of the Targets Plan, Lucas Lopes, pointed out the need to "integrate forces" in order to respond to the demand for electrical materials. Lopes also indicated the option of incorporating international private capital into the production of capital goods in the Brazilian economy. 4 In order to overcome the limits of payment balance and allow the industrialization process to continue, the development strategy employed by the Kubitschek administration was to encourage multinationals to enter the Brazilian market. In this sense, while the State fostered economic growth through investments in infrastructure, international private initiative introduced industries through multinational companies that were more technologically sophisticated -reducing the pressure to import products central to industrial development -and national private groups developed on the fringes of these new industries in order to provide basic equipment and material to those multinational companies (Evans 1982; Lago et al. 1979, 100 ).
The government's presence was fundamental to articulate investments in infrastructure, opening up favorable horizons for negotiations and for attracting direct investment in the durable consumer goods and production goods industries, within the international scenario of multinational companies' expanding to late industrialized countries (Lima 1995, 76) . Among the government's tools for encouraging foreign industries to come to the country, the most relevant was Currency and Credit Board Instruction no. 113, which fostered the opening of the market and, consequently, increased the participation of the capital goods industry in national economic production as a whole, in addition to causing changes in the sector's configuration.
According to Venilton Tadini's survey on the structure of the Brazilian industrial sector, the capital goods sector, which accounted for five percent of the manufacturing industry's gross production value in 1949, accounted for approximately 10 percent in 1959. In addition, regarding company capital sources, 75 percent of these companies relied mainly on national capital at the beginning of the period, while in 1961 this share fell to 61 percent (Tadini 1986, 24-26; Lago et al. 1979, 113) . This trend would be even more pronounced in modern sectors, since these national companies mostly worked with the production of less technologically complex equipment. 5 On-demand capital goods from the power sector, such as turbines and generators, could take years to be produced if they had to be adapted to the specific aspects of each project. This process required a financial and technological structure that was not available to private national groups.
6
With space open for companies from abroad to now operate in the Brazilian market, there was a notable trend during the period of foreign companies setting up power sector plants. (Tadini 1986, 131-3). 7 Regarding this data, until the mid-1950s Brazil essentially relied on imported equipment to meet the increased demand for power generation. However, with multinationals arriving in the country in the early 1960s, it is possible to affirm that there was already developed production in the country, which was available to the new hydroelectric projects under construction ( Table   1 ). The 29th goal of the Targets Plan was then fulfilled: domestic production of equipment such as hydraulic turbines, generators, transformers and motors above 20HP. This equipment was mainly produced as a result of multinational participation in the national economy.
6 Cf. Lessa (1975) ; Leff (1968) ; Lago et al. (1979) and Erber (1974) . 7 General Electric and Siemens had already been producing goods in Brazil since the 1920s, but their plants were designed for the production of small-scale products or consumer goods, such as small appliances. With the General Electric factories in Campinas and the Siemens factories in São Paulo, these companies began to offer more complex products, such as hydro generators and higher power transformers (Cachapuz 2006, 252) . Thus, there was an increase in the relative share of domestic production in the domestic market; based on this, from 1958 to 1961, imports in US dollars were 11.7 percent higher, while real domestic output rose by 93.4 percent (Lago et al. 1979, 110) . In other words, the Targets Plan allowed the heavy electrical materials industry to flourish in the 1960s through foreign exchange instruments and by making the government an important consumer (Leff 1968, 22, 104) . 9 It is worth noting that nationalization of production by establishing capital goods industries in the country did not mean nationalization of the control of these companies.
Development of the sector, with government support, was based on stimulus for multinational 8 Leff's data regard the general consumption of goods in each sector. In relation to the power sector, when solely considering data on the consumption of capital goods in this sector, average imports in the early 1960s is between 30 percent and 40 percent (Lago et al. 1979, 133) . 9 According to Fabio Erber: "between the postwar period and the 1960s, the public sector's share in gross capital formation in the country rose from 22 percent to 55 percent, which provides an idea of the State's demand for equipment" (Erber 1974, 18 This was the context in which the metalworking industry in Santa Catarina, especially in northeastern Santa Catarina, reached the southeastern market in Brazil. 10 Driven by government policies, these industries were consolidated in the 1950s, supplying the automotive and public services sectors, such as sanitation and the electrical grid formation. Industrialists in the Joinville region, who maintained close ties with Europe and especially with Germany (for technological research, specialized labor and professional qualification), used their own 10 In Jaraguá do Sul, local development was linked to that of other nearby cities, such as Joinville and Blumenau. In its home city, WEG, in a sense, shared the market with Kohlbach, which emerged in 1945 from an electrical appliances repair shop run by Rodolfo Kohlbach that had been operating since at least the late 1930s. This company began to manufacture dynamos and alternators in the 1950s; later, in the 1960s, it began small-scale production of electric motors. Kohlbach was acquired by Nova Motores e Geradores Elétricos Ltda. in 1996 (A Notícia, August 3, 1938). These electrical equipment sector companies, along with Malwee, Wiest, Marisol and other important companies in the city, had substantial needs in terms of manpower. In order to supply this demand, workers in Jaraguá do Sul were to a large extent brought in from the state of Paraná (where WEG was especially well-known), attracted by the strategies of local firms, such as advertising (Schörner 2006; Moretti 1988 private international capital contributed to building the sector, both in the provision of services and in exporting equipment to Brazil. However, at that time, this capital was used to internalize production, ensuring these companies maintained their market shares and taking advantage of government support, whether to establish companies in the country or to be the consumer of products. National capital remained at the edges of the market, through industries that would provide inputs to the newly-installed multinationals or that served to produce less technologically complex goods.
The founding and growth of WEG during the military government
Scholars have pointed out that the military government managed to intensify the process of import-substituting industrialization that had been increased since the early 1950s. This movement led to unprecedented industrial growth that was stimulated by a set of economic policies, such as quantitative import restrictions, tariffs, direct exchange control, fiscal subsidies, and easier access to credit. A substantial structural change was also evident and the vertical integration of the intersectoral relationships in industry was another striking feature of imported equipment specified by creditors. Yet, this policy would have little effect on WEG, as it entered the electrical equipment market with no resistance from the biggest players, whose focus was on producing turbines and generators. Put another way, WEG focused on a portfolio of less sophisticated products, such as engines and transformers. Even when it started to produce turbines, the company emphasized the Small Hydro market instead of businesses that were already dominated by established multinationals in the country.
A second moment of this phase began in 1971. Once again, government resources were fundamental for investments to expand production: together, support from FUNDEC, BRDE, and BNDES financed 50 percent of the company's investment (Coutinho 1995) . Moreover, the company went public this same year and its shares began to be traded on stock exchanges. In 1973, construction started on the second plant, which was completed four years later. During this time, WEG began to strengthen its business and it soon cast engine housings, produced copper wires and developed its own precision tooling; even its wooden packaging received investments (Vidigal 2011; Fonseca and Bruno 2009 ).
In the second half of the 1970s, the company's management underwent professionalization that resulted in technology being developed to produce medium-sized engines and in consolidation of the Technological Center. This was therefore a period of gains of scale and technological improvements that led to production being restructured through the creation of specialized operational units (specialization with intrasectoral diversification) and to initial movement towards intersectoral productive diversification (Coutinho 1995) . At that time, the company had already reached markets in 20 countries, mainly in Latin America. In addition, in 1976, it opened an office in Germany whose good results were due to the company's relationship with local producers. diversification is unlikely to be carried out without the direct intervention of the government or without any other governmental action to encourage private industrial investment.
In the case of information externalities, entrepreneurs should make small adjustments according to the technologies adopted by foreign producers and adapt them to local conditions. This process is called "self-discovery", according to Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) . It can be applied to the fact that, in 1979, WEG announced the formation of a joint-venture with ASEA, a Swedish company, in order to develop of engineering, manufacturing, sales, assembly, and technical assistance projects for electrical products and systems. The association with the Swedish company gave rise to the WEG/ASEA Industrial Ltda. Company. On the one hand, the activities of the Eletromotores WEG Company, which worked exclusively with national capital, continued to focus on the production of AC and DC motors as well as alternators.
ASEA, on the other hand, focused on the production of transformers and relays, in addition to electricity generation, transmission and distribution services.
11
Another challenge inherent to the process of diversification is associated with coordination externalities. Failures in the coordination of investments are common when new industries find advantages in importing their main inputs, thus making the coordination of simultaneous investments unnecessary. In general, it is difficult to predict whether an entrepreneur's individual investment decision will be accompanied by other complementary initiatives. The government must therefore foster the viability of certain production chains by working with the private sector to coordinate the investments required to ensure an individual return on each project. Otherwise, these projects would fail to generate returns if they were implemented in an isolated manner (Almeida 2013, 278).
Unsurprisingly, the industrial policy implemented during the period of the "economic miracle" was characterized by significant subsidies for exporting manufactured goods. Among the results of this policy is an exceptionally high growth rate (20.5 percent per year) on domestic production of capital goods from 1967 to 1973, which rose from 9.0 million to 27.7 million cruzeiros (Bonelli and Malan 1976, 386-387) . Granting of government subsidies, in addition to other incentives such as tax exemptions for certain companies and sectors, can be interpreted as government efforts to facilitate the identification of goods whose production the country could efficiently internalize. Given that such incentives were usually aimed at new production activities, the industrial policy of the military governments of the late 1960s and 1970s assumed the role of determining the pace of the import substitution process.
In order to illustrate the topics addressed above, in 1981 WEG received funding from the Industrial Development Council (CDI -Conselho de Desenvolvimento Industrial), which approved almost one hundred industrial projects in that fiscal year. (Ternes 1997; Vidigal 2011). 13 This growth in the company and diversification in production were the result of the government policy implemented in the mid-1970s under the auspices of the Second National Development
Plan, which sought to strengthen national companies' production capacity for intermediate and capital goods, aimed at promoting the import substitution process. This policy intended to relieve the short-term pressures on balance of payment accounts, especially after the first international oil crisis. Among the Plan's proposals was transformation of small-and mediumsized companies in these two sectors into large companies, which would then serve to supply government-owned companies with machinery and raw materials.
In fact, the spread of government-owned enterprises was seen as the key to raising the rate of According to Strachman (1992) , the rate of "nationalization" of turbines and hydrogenerators -that is, production within the country, including through multinationals -reached an approximate average of 60 percent from 1969 to 1985. Tadini (1986, 83) Although sectorial indices were indicating a drop in the share of imports in total supplies, it was only after 1977 that the aggregate import coefficient fell below its 1973 level (Fishlow 1986, 520) . At any rate, judging by the main goal of the Geisel administration, which was to expand and diversify the production capacity of the industrial inputs sector, the government stimulated demand through ambitious infrastructure projects that it was unable to finance. The alternative of pursuing accelerated growth through external debt was only a short-term solution for the issue of adjusting the balance of payments. At the same time, internal imbalances soon proved to be the evident limitations of the monetary correction instruments that had been implemented since the early years of the military regime. and BADESC 17 (Development Bank of the State of Santa Catarina). In this context, "WEG managed to make heavily subsidized investments" (Silva 1997, 484) .
The conquest of the international market
Even so, after a phase of production growth during the Second National Development Plan, the company had relatively stagnant production in the first half of the 1980s. In the opinion of Abinee, there was significant domestic demand in the months following the launch of the Cruzado Plan that would allow for recovery in the sector, especially with regard to electronic components manufacturers. Regarding the electrical equipment industry, there was an expectation that recovery would be limited, since its sales were credited to the period preceding introduction of the monetary package. According to the newspaper: "In terms of sales, the businessmen in this segment [electrical equipment] -which is already chronically dependent on supplying government-owned companies -saw their prospects limited even further with the issue of the economic reform."
18
In 1985, WEG SA became a holding company and created WEG Motores to take over the operational functions of the group's main activity, which at that time was responsible more than 70 percent of its revenues. From that point forward, the second half of the 1980s would see a sharp increase in the company's production, and only WEG Motores would more than double its revenues in the period. Completing the diversification process within the electronics division, WEG Automação Ltda was created in 1986, based on the experiences of WEG Acionamentos, which aimed to broaden the group's core business ( Caption: na -not available Source: Coutinho (1995); Ternes (1997) Nevertheless, the concession of the Petrobras Qualidade-86 Award to WEG showed the importance of the public sector as a customer for the electric motor company. In his acceptance speech, Ozires Silva, President of Petrobras, highlighted the quality of WEG's products, whose electric motors with a capacity of up to 5000 HP were used in the company's pipelines, trucks and, especially, at oil production platforms. 20 WEG Motores was also awarded the Cacex incentives of around R$173 million, or about 12.2 percent of the program's total resources.
Although WEG's internationalization is considered an intentional element that came from top management at the company (from founders Eggon João da Silva, Werner Voigt and Geraldo
Werninghaus as well as from the company's directors), the company could not have fulfilled this goal without government support. However, unlike in the 1970s and 1980s, when the government and domestic market demanded large quantities of equipment, it was the international market that had the best opportunities in the 1990s (Table 4) . In Brazil, during this same period, the company's industrial asset also added important manufacturing units, reaching 14 manufacturing units in 2017. Since 2010, WEG has continued its internationalization efforts, promoting a series of acquisitions that have made its industrial park more robust outside of Brazil. Acquisitions abroad were therefore combined with acquisitions in Brazil, as in the case of Mesba Motores Elétricos de Guarulhos (a major producer of electric motors for household appliances), acquired in 1997, and more recently HISA (Hidráulica Industrial Ltda., of Joaçaba, Santa Catarina, which has produced turbines and other hydromechanical equipment for small hydro power stations since the 1950s) (Vidigal 2011; HISA 2017) . 23 This movement was apparent from the growth in the WEG Group's Net
Operating Revenue. As of 2012, revenues coming from outside of Brazil have outperformed the domestic market (Table 5) . 2011 WEG. Financial Statements. 2011 Again, these results in the international market would not have been reached without government support. WEG's place as a government darling was reaffirmed during the Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva administration (2003 Silva administration ( -2010 . Using the BNDES as an instrument to boost national companies, the policy undertaken by the Brazilian government was to finance national companies so that they could achieve the best position possible in the global market. This was done, for instance, through the internationalization line, through which the BNDES supported (WEG, 2012a; WEG, 2013a; WEG, 2014a; WEG, 2015a; WEG, 2016a; WEG, 2017a Additionally, WEG has been a traditional customer of export financing lines, essentially the pre-shipment financing lines, where BNDES finances part of the company's production destined for export, helping in competitive cost formation so that the company can operate in the international market, offering more favorable prices and conditions to clients, compatible with international competitors. BNDES has therefore helped the company to conquer new markets and consolidate its position as one of the largest Brazilian exporters of capital goods and one of the largest players in the world in its industry. The development of new WEG products and processes is also supported by BNDES through its funds, which contributed to the frequency and consistency of the group's investment in innovation (BNDES 2017, 319-321) .
In short, there were three international insertion strategies, as usually recalled in the literature aimed at understanding company's internationalization: distribution and commercial representation by third parties; creation of dedicated companies for distribution and after-sales service; and establishment, or acquisition, of manufacturing plants abroad. These models were Notwithstanding these effective achievements at the company, which also highlight relevant decisions made internally by the company's management, this paper sought to emphasize a dimension that is not widely remarked upon in the literature: the fundamental relationship between the company and the government. As demonstrated, each of the company's development phases was also marked by an approximation with governmental policies, which catapulted the company from its local operations into becoming a leading company in the sector. Its origin is perfectly articulated with the structure of the division of national markets among national, foreign and government capitals, established by import substitution programs since the Kubitschek administration. Its development depended substantially on government demands during the military government, central to which was a project to expand the supply of energy based on Eletrobras. Even in the 1980s, when the Brazilian economy entered a profound crisis scenario, the company was continued to benefit from state programs, in a vicious cycle that would allow its continued positioning among the leaders of the national electric sector. More recently, the company has depended on BNDES policy to finance its production and ensure its remarkable market share in the international trade. In short, if the internal decisions of the company are to be considered, understanding their due correctness, the dimension of the development of the sector as a whole cannot be dismissed. Such analysis allows for a more far-reaching and less heroic comprehension of the WEG's achievements.
